1. Recalling JEF Europe’s resolutions, a) “For a common European response to the invasion of Ukraine and the future of Ukraine”; b) “The EU response to the Russian Federation’s aggression of Ukraine”, strongly condemning Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, now in its fourth year, and demanding stronger EU support to Ukraine, including military, financial, and humanitarian assistance;
2. Noting with frustration the limits of the EU’s foreign policy and the related unanimity rule in the framework of the ENP, which remains too often constrained and paralysed by the conflicting positions of the Member States in the Council, allowing a single country to block sanctions, enlargement steps, or crisis responses;
3. Deeply concerned about the human toll of active and unresolved conflicts across the region, including Russia’s war against Ukraine, the continued occupation of Georgian territories, Azerbaijan’s ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population, and the frozen conflict in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova;
4. Denouncing Russia’s comprehensive destabilisation campaign aimed at undermining EaP countries through military aggression, hybrid attacks, election interference, disinformation, energy blackmail, trade embargoes, and the conclusion of integration treaties with separatist or breakaway regions, such as South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria, Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson;
5. Noting with regret the insufficient reaction of the EU to Russia’s violation of Georgian territorial integrity in 2008 and the consequent emboldening of Russia, and insisting that the EU must learn from this failure by adopting a credible deterrence , sanctions and defence policy today;
6. Noting with concern, the growing influence and destabilising actions of external actors in the South Caucasus and Black Sea regions, including Türkiye’s assertive posture, Iran’s deepening ties, and China’s expanding economic footprint;
7. Having regarded the implementation of the EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement since 2019, and welcoming Armenia’s historic pivot towards the European Union, demonstrated by: the effective suspension of its CSTO membership; active participation in the EU civilian mission; the launch of visa liberalisation dialogues; and the adoption of a law on initiating EU accession in early 2025, while noting that Armenia intends to maintain its economic ties with the Eurasian Economic Union;
8. Condemning the ethnic cleansing of the entire Armenian population of Nagorno Karabakh by Azerbaijan following Azerbaijan’s September 2023 military offensive, and deeply concerned by the lack of provisions for the right of return in the peace agreement concluded in 2025 and ongoing threats to Armenian cultural and religious heritage;
9. Deeply concerned that following decoupling from Russia, the EU has become increasingly dependent on other non-democratic regimes like Azerbaijan for energy, without imposing meaningful human rights conditionality, thereby undermining the EU’s credibility as a normative power;
10. Deeply concerned about Belarus’s complete subordination to Russia since the fraudulent 2020 elections, including: the permanent stationing of Russian tactical nuclear weapons; the presence of Wagner Group mercenaries; the integration of Belarusian territory into Russia’s military planning; the regime’s complicity in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children; and the instrumentalisation of migration as a hybrid warfare tool, and strongly condemning the continued brutal response of the authorities against the opposition, now largely in exile, in prison, or silenced;
11. Applauding the progress made by Ukraine and Moldova towards EU membership, welcoming the opening of accession negotiations with both countries and the completion of bilateral screening, and noting that the European Commission assessed in late 2025 that both countries are ready to open thematic clusters including the fundamental cluster on justice and human rights;
12. Condemning the actions of the illegitimate Georgian government led by Georgian Dream including the deliberate dismantling of democratic institutions, including: the adoption of the Russian-style “foreign agents” law; brutal crackdowns on peaceful protesters; anti-LGBTQI+ legislation; and the reversal of democratic reforms, while expressing continued solidarity with the Georgian people’s unwavering European aspirations and resistance against the illegitimate regime;
13. Additionally deeply concerned about the significant challenges faced by the EaP countries in ensuring an adequate level of human rights standards, as well as the state of democracy and the rule of law;
14. Reiterating the importance of freedom of the media, freedom of expression and the activities of non-governmental organisations and human rights defenders, especially represented in youth organisations, in shaping public opinion based on factual information free from foreign interference, hybrid threats and disinformation;
15. Recalling the essential contribution of civil society organisations, such as the members of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, regarding the quality of democracy and their important involvement in the dialogue between the European institutions and the EaP countries;
16. Acknowledging that the ‘Beyond 2020’ framework on the Eastern Partnership has become obsolete given the fundamentally different relationships the EU now maintains with accession candidates, authoritarian regimes, and countries under Russian occupation;
17. Reminding that the campaign “Democracy under Pressure”, which aims to raise awareness of democratic backsliding, human rights abuses, and challenges to the rule of law, initially in Belarus, is one of JEF’s oldest campaigns, and has expanded in relevance to encompass democratic collapse in Georgia, authoritarian consolidation in Azerbaijan, and the ongoing struggle for democracy across the region;
18. Noting the launch of the EU’s Common Maritime Agenda for the Black Sea and the strategic approach to the Black Sea region adopted in 2025, which establishes three pillars: enhancing security and resilience, fostering sustainable growth, and promoting environmental protection;
19. Recognising the importance of climate diplomacy and green transition cooperation with Eastern Partnership countries, particularly in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, as part of the EU’s strategic interest in building resilient and sustainable societies.

1. Reiterates the EU’s commitment to strengthening multilateralism and recalls the importance of developing a common European foreign policy as the only way to pursue peace and international justice;
2. Demands the introduction of qualified majority voting in particular in foreign policy decisions concerning the Eastern neighbourhood, ending the paralysis caused by individual Member States, who entertain close diplomatic and economic ties with the Russian Federation, blocking sanctions, enlargement steps, or crisis responses;
3. Insists that the most important area on which the EU’s Eastern policy should be focused is the advancement of respect for human rights, the rule of law, and the achievement of a higher standard of democracy, while recognising that the needs differ fundamentally between accession countries, where conditionality applies, countries suffering from armed aggression and authoritarian regimes, where support must flow exclusively to civil society and independent media;
4. Encourages the EU institutions to further intensify their cooperation with the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in monitoring and implementing strategies and practices aimed at improving the level of democracy, the rule of law, and achieving the expression of political and civil rights for all citizens;
5. Mandates the EU to maintain and significantly expand sanctions on Belarus indefinitely, targeting sectors enabling Russian military integration, the forced deportation of Ukrainian children, and the regime’s hybrid warfare operations, including migration manipulation, and to maintain these sanctions until free and fair elections are held and all political prisoners are released;
6. Requires the EU to significantly increase and simplify funding for local independent civil society, human rights defenders, independent universities, research centres, independent media, and democratic movements across the Eastern neighbourhood, with particular attention to organisations operating under authoritarian regimes where access is restricted and risks are high;
7. Demands that the EU massively scale up support for independent media, fact-checking organisations, and media literacy programmes as a direct counter to Russian disinformation campaigns and state propaganda;
8. Insists that the EU actively support EaP countries in safeguarding their rights under international law, including territorial integrity, and champion accountability mechanisms for crimes of aggression, war crimes, and human rights violations committed in the region, through support for international tribunals and prosecution mechanisms;
9. Demands that the EU take a leading role in conflict resolution and peace-building across the region, including through expanded civilian monitoring missions such as EUMA in Armenia, active participation in existing negotiation formats, and targeted sanctions against spoilers;
10. Insists that any peace agreements addressing regional conflicts include explicit provisions for the right of return of displaced populations and protection of cultural and religious heritage;
11. Demands that energy cooperation with Azerbaijan be conditioned on meaningful human rights compliance, with suspension mechanisms for continued violations, including review of the EU-Azerbaijan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, imposing targeted sanctions on those responsible for arbitrary detention, and freezing expanded energy cooperation until tangible human rights progress is made;
12. Calls on the EU to articulate a clear and differentiated long-term strategy for the Eastern neighbourhood, offering credible EU membership to willing and reform-minded countries, deepening security and defence cooperation to counter Russian aggression, supporting the resilience of societies under authoritarian rule, and keeping the door open to all Eastern partners that demonstrate genuine commitment to European values and reforms;
13. Demands that the EU pursue a merit-based but politically ambitious enlargement agenda that:
    1. maintains momentum in accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, supporting the opening of the fundamental cluster on justice and human rights;
    2. offers a credible European perspective to Georgia, conditional on a fundamental reversal of anti-democratic legislation;
    3. explores deepened political association with Armenia should it continue its European orientation, while acknowledging its complex economic ties;
    4. keeps the door open to other Eastern partners that demonstrate genuine commitment to European values
14. Insists on the full implementation of Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with willing and reform-minded countries, and calls for their gradual extension to cover sectoral integration in energy, digital markets, transport, and green transition, as a pathway to closer economic alignment with the EU single market;
15. Supports deeper sectoral integration between the EU and willing Eastern partners, including:
    1. transport connectivity through extension of TEN-T networks;
    2. digital integration through roaming agreements and harmonisation of digital markets;
    3. energy cooperation through synchronisation of grids and renewable energy partnerships;
    4. green transition through access to EU climate financing;
16. Insists on the role that the EU, in cooperation with civil society organisations, must play in promoting civil and political rights, in ensuring the protection of ethnic and religious minorities including Armenians remaining in Azerbaijan and national minorities in Georgia, and in defending the civil rights of the most discriminated and harassed members of society, including those in the LGBTQI+ community who face increasing state-sponsored persecution in several EaP countries;
17. Requires a major expansion of EU youth programmes in the Eastern neighbourhood, including Erasmus+, European Solidarity Corps, and dedicated youth mobility schemes, with simplified visa procedures and increased funding to ensure that young people in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia (including refugees and vulnerable groups) have meaningful opportunities for education, training, and exchange within the EU;
18. Calls on the EU to grant observer status in the European Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee to Ukraine and Moldova, and to maintain such status for Georgia only if democratic progress resumes;
19. Demands the systematic inclusion of civil society organisations as co-decision-making actors in the EU accession processes of Eastern Partnership countries, including their formal participation in national coordination mechanisms, screening processes, and reform monitoring, in order to ensure democratic legitimacy, transparency, and long-term societal ownership of EU integration;
20. Mandates full implementation of the EU’s Common Maritime Agenda for the Black Sea, with adequate funding for military mobility infrastructure, a maritime security monitoring hub, and connectivity corridors;
21. Urges the EU to finalise a legal framework for the confiscation of frozen Russian state assets for the reconstruction of Ukraine, extending this principle to Belarusian regime assets.

First adopted by the online Federal Committee on 26 June 2021. Re-adopted and amended by the Federal Committee on 11 November 2023 in Madrid, Spain; and re-adopted and amended to its current form by the Federal Committee on 19 April 2026 in Belgrade, Serbia.